Africa lags behind other regio ns in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). In some circumstances, there are obvious explanations for the absence of FDI, such as a high incidence of war. In this paper, we examine the role that monetary and exchange rate policy may have played in explaining this outcome. Specifically, we document the incidence of inflationary episodes and currency crashes in order to compare countries within the region as well as to make comparisons with other regions. Furthermore, since monetary policy can range from very transparent to very opaque, we assess Africa's track record with dual and parallel markets. We use the parallel market premia as an indicators of the degree of distortions and extent of transparency. Our findings, suggest that this is a promising line of inquiry because Africa does stand apart from other regions in this measure of transparency. We also discuss some of the fiscal underpinnings of Africa's bouts with high inflation.
I. Introduction
Strong, stable macroeconomic policies are not sufficient conditions for investment and growth. Among many other important factors is the transparency of macroeconomic policies, robust institutions, low levels of corruption, absence of wars, openness to trade, and a favorable external environment. But macroeconomic policy stability-especially price stability-is almost certainly an essential ingredient. Without it, the risks to doing business rise drastically, internal trade is significantly hampered, and external trade even more so.
High and unpredictable inflation, especially, cripples business planning and checks the development of financial intermediation within the private sector. Because this is well known, many countries throughout the world have strived to achieve notable success in bringing down inflation since the 1980s in the industrialized countries and especially over the 1990s, in emerging markets and developing countries. The key to achieve this is wellknown and well-proven: a strong, independent central bank that places a high weight on maintaining low inflation.
Whether this low inflation is attained through appointing skilled, highly competent central bankers who are known to be committed to price stability-the most common approach-or through a more complex institutionalized system of checks and balances-or both, is second-order compared to maintaining meaningful central bank independence.
Some have argued that this prescription cannot be transferred to sub-Saharan Africa because many countries in the region are in too early phases of political development. These countries, according to this argument, lack the necessary institutional structure to establish a meaningfully independent central bank. If the judiciary and the Parliament are unduly influenced by the chief executive or the rule of law is in some other ways indistinct, the central bank has nowhere to hide. In such circumstances, when the chief executive phones the head of the central bank and asks for funds, the central bank can hardly refuse. Because of these internal pressures, many African countries have sought to import price stability through joining a regional currency or joining a regional currency block anchored to a reserve currency, such as the euro or the dollar.
Aside from currency arrangements, many developing countries must, by necessity, put a high premium on attracting foreign direct investment. Yet, as Figure 1 illustrates, foreign direct investment (FDI) to Africa does not depend on whether the large economies, such as the United States are in recession or not. Furthermore, Africa did not benefit much from the surge in FDI to emerging markets during the 1990s. How can these nations achieve the climate of price stability needed to facilitate investment? This is a difficult question that we shall attempt to address by examining some essential features of the historical experience of Africa with inflation and exchange rate arrangements, drawing on the extensive chronologies developed in Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) --that encompass all countries of the world. This historical perspective yields some useful insights. First, the typical inflation and exchange rate experience in post-colonial, non-CFA Africa is weak compared with that Europe and Asia. But, even excluding the more stable CFA franc zone countries, it is not notably worse than the experiences of many countries in Latin-America, the Middle East, or post-1980s transition economies. This may seem like faint praise, since so many countries in these other regions have such a chequered inflation history. But it is relevant if one wants to argue that Africa needs a completely different set of arrangements than elsewhere. Secondly, we find that the incidence of extremely high parallel exchange market premia of 50 percent or more (exceeding 500 percent in some cases) is remarkably high in Africa, and herein lies the real differences.
Averaging across all countries, between 1979 and 1998, the parallel premia in non-CFA subSaharan Africa exceeded 50 percent more than one-third of the time! We argue that parallel premia at this level are highly problematic, in that they breed significant corruption and governance problems. As such, they are often an excellent barometer of broader and deeper problems in macroeconomic stabilization and governance. The case for advocating unified exchange rate regimes rests as much on improving governance and reducing corruption, as on any macroeconomic benefit. A third conclusion we reach is that adopting the currency of an industrialized country has its own set of problems, not the least astonishing incidence of frequent deflation.
The paper is divided into six parts, including this introduction. The second section of the paper briefly puts the post-colonial African exchange rate experience in perspective relative to Europe. The third section looks at the incidence of high inflation and the frequency of currency crashes in Africa compared to other regions. Here, our emphasis is in assessing the extent to which price and currency instability is behind the low observed levels of FDI. In our analysis of behavior of the parallel market premia in the fourth section, we find that the high probability of extremely large premia makes the African experience markedly different from the rest of the world. We argue that the high parallel premia may be symptomatic of more general governance problems in many cases, including corruption, and creating obstacles to trade-with deleterious consequences for FDI. The fifth section of the paper offers some insights on the root cause of inflation from a broad theoretical perspective.
This perspective suggests that the funding needs of the fiscal authority-that is,--fiscal dominance-is likely to be significant problem for many of the highly indebted African countries. The concluding section speculates on options for Africa in the light of the experience.
II. The African Experience in Perspective
Modern central banking is a relatively recent development. Only a couple hundred years ago, few countries in the world had the governmental checks and balances needed to maintain an independent central bank. As a case in point, the central bank of Spain began, in 1782, as the Bank of St. Charles, founded originally as a quasi-private bank by King Charles III of Spain. The unabashed purpose was to help absorb government debt. The name of the bank itself speaks volumes about how (not) independent it was from the chief executive. there is a strong case to be made that improved monetary policy has been one factor in the greater stability of output and employment observed in many industrialized countries since the 1980s. This part is illustrated dramatically in Figure 2 , which gives year-to-year changes in growth rates for the G-7 (Japan is an exception) and the world. As is evident from the figure, and can be confirmed by closer statistical analysis, output volatility has been dropping dramatically since the mid-1980s. Thus, while high inflation is often a symptom rather than a cause of growth problems, it can also be a problem in its own right.
III. High Inflation, Currency Crashes, and FDI: Is Africa Different?
The aim of this section is descriptive, as we neither offer nor test a formal model of the determinants of FDI to Africa nor to any other region. 1 We begin by looking at some of the possible "pull" factors that may influence FDI. As to "push" factors, Reinhart and Reinhart (2001) show that FDI to developing countries has an important cyclical component, more so than other types of capital flows. As a general rule, FDI flows more heavily to emerging market economies when the United States economy is expanding than when it is in recession. This cyclical pattern has important consequences for the volume of FDI that developing countries in Asia and Western Hemisphere receive, as illustrated in Figure 1 . Yet, the cycle is not relevant for African economies, which generally receive very little FDI at any stage of the U.S. cycle. Indeed, looking at panel data on total capital flows to Africa, Calvo and Reinhart (1997) conclude that, in contrast to other regions, the only external factor that systematically influences capital flows to Africa is world commodity prices. Flows increase during booms in commodity prices and, other things equal, decline during busts. In what follows, we document what could, in principle, be expected to be deterrents to investing in Africa.
The basics for attracting FDI
An obvious and powerful deterrent to FDI is political instability. Edwards (1990) finds that the political instability are always statistically significant, irrespective of what other variables are included as regressors in his cross-country regressions. Of course, wars are an extreme form of political instability-and Africa has had more than its share. Using the dates of wars provided in Collier and Hoeffler (2001) and (2002), we constructed the probability of war for three regions, Africa, Asia, and Western Hemisphere (excluding Canada and the United States), over 1960-2001. This probability is simply the number of months during which there was a war over the total number of months for a particular country. We then average across countries to obtain the regional number. As shown in Table   1 , the probability for Africa, at 12.6 percent, is almost twice as large as that of the developing Western Hemisphere but slightly below the number for Asia. However, column (3) paints a strikingly different picture-40 percent of the countries in Africa have had at least one war during 1960-2001, 28 percent of the countries have had two or more. This is more than three times the incidence of war in Western Hemisphere and almost twice that of Asia. In the case of the latter, the higher probability shown in column (2) reflects that a smaller number of countries had longer wars.
While wars, per se, are a likely deterrent to FDI, wars also are often a source of another deterrent to FDI, inflation. Sources: Collier and Hoeffler (2001) and (2002) and authors' calculations
The incidence of high inflation and currency crashes
As a rule of thumb, we can take a 40 percent inflation rate over a 12-month period as the threshold over which price instability becomes seriously dysfunctional. In Africa, there are five countries where the average annual inflation rate over the 1970-2001 period exceeded 40 percent. These are shown in Table 2 , alongside the probability of war, as measured by the percent of months during which there was conflict. For four of the five highinflation cases, the probability of war was notably higher than for the rest of Africa. Furthermore, for those four cases, not only is inflation well above the average than for the 2 Indeed, as can be documented from the worldwide historical exchange rate chronologies in Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) , the Democratic Republic of the Congo has experienced two hyperinflations since World War II. To date, no other country has had more than one.
rest of the region-the probability of war is also well above the average for the remainder of the countries in the region.
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against the backdrop of a pegged official exchange rate but, rather, against a backdrop of a loss of monetary control.
To compare Africa's performance in this dimension to that of other regions, we constructed two measures of currency crashes, that are very similar to those introduced by Frankel and Rose (1996) . The first of these definitions of currency crashes measures a "severe" currency crash, which refers to a 25 percent or higher monthly depreciation which is, in turn, at least 10 percent higher than the previous month's depreciation. The "milder" version represents a 12.5 percent monthly depreciation that is at least 10 percent above the preceding month's depreciation. To put these magnitudes in perspective, monthly depreciations of this magnitude, when annualized, amount to 1, 355 and 310 percent, respectively.
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 7 present regional averages, while Appendix Tables 1-4 give the individual country particulars. Not surprisingly, the regional patterns that emerge are very similar to those of the high inflation episodes. Africa (excluding CFA and North Africa) has a similar propensity to crash as Western Hemisphere, and both regions compare poorly to Asia and the other regions. Currency instability, as measured by frequent currency crashes, is strongly linked to poor inflation performance, and ex ante it can be expected that neither is conducive to a favorable inflation climate. Indeed, Kamaly (2001) , who covers a panel of 151 countries over the 1990 to 1999, presents systematic evidence that that such exchange rate volatility has a significant adverse impact on FDI flows.
However, this discussion has only focused on the inflation and exchange rate crisis outcomes of monetary policy. A dimension of monetary policy that would also be expected to influence investment decisions is the transparency (or lack thereof) of the policy arrangement-an issue examined in the next section.
IV. Distortions and Lack of Transparency: The Role of Exchange Rate Arrangements
Dual markets and multiple exchange rates are-by far-the least transparent form of exchange rate arrangement. Usually, although not always, dual rates are accompanied by a variety of restrictions on capital movements. If there is (in principle) a dual market, but capital flows freely (as was the case in Belgium up until 1990 and the CFA zone until 1993), the free market premium tends to be trivially small. However, whe n there are tight capital account restrictions, dual markets can really have teeth and the free market premia can be astonishingly high. Under these conditions, and especially if there are multiple exchange rates, monetary policy is at its most opaque. It is typically also in this kind of arrangement that corruption can flourish with a vengeance. Reinhart and Rogoff's (2002) re-classification of historical exchange rate arrangements recognizes that the official exchange rate can be meaningless in this setting and that dual or multiple exchange rate practices need to be treated as a separate category. To do so, we constructed detailed chronologies-such as the sample one shown on Table 8 for Ghana. The episodes labeled "freely falling" are the instances when the 12-month inflation rate was above 40 percent, what we have called here "high inflation" episodes. 5 The chronology also notes when dual or multiple exchange rate practices are in place. The Cedi is officially pegged to US Dollar. There are multiple exchange rates. June 19, 1978 -May 1984 Freely falling/Managed floating/Parallel Market
The prevalence of dual exchange rates
The official peg to the US Dollar is abandoned. There are multiple exchange rates. June 1984 -April 1986 Freely floating/Parallel market There are multiple exchange rates. May 1986 -September 19, 1986 Freely falling/Freely floating/Parallel Market
There are multiple exchange rates. 
The parallel premia, distortions, and corruption
Appendix Tables 9-11 document the likelihood that the monthly parallel market premia exceed three high thresholds. While a 50 percent premia would be considered already high, we also document the incidence of the probability-by country and region-that the premia exceeds 100 and 500 percent. Figures 5 and 6 provide a cross-regional comparison.
The main point that emerges from this exercise is that to the extent that the premia is a catchall for distortions, lack of transparency, and corruption, non-CFA Africa stands out from other regions by the extremely high incidence of very high premia. Even relative to the chronic-inflation crisis prone Western Hemisphere, the comparison is striking. The likelihood of premia above 50 percent is 35 and 23 percent for Africa and Western Hemisphere, respectively. Premia above the 100 percent threshold prevail in 25 percent of the months during 1970-1998 in Africa-more than twice that for Western Hemisphere, while premia over 500 percent are present in 10 percent of the months.
An interesting exercise involves looking jointly at (a) the probability that the premia is above 50 percent over 1970-1998 for each of the countries in our sample, and (b) the corruption index published by Transparency International for 2000, which assigns a value of zero to the most corrupt countries and a value of ten to the most transparent. The simple pairwise correlation between the two is 0.55, which is statistically significant at standard confidence levels-indeed, this simple exercise may suggest that the ranking of countries by their transparency exhibits considerable inertia. 
What does it all mean for FDI?
We have suggested that the investment climate is adversely influenced by actual wars-or the odds of a war. Wars, in turn, apart from the destruction of life and 6 The transparency index was not published prior to 2000 and our data on the parallel market rate ends in 1998.
-19 -infrastructure, seem to bring additional deterrents to investment, such as frequent currency crashes and high inflation. Even when not accompanied by war, the prospects of price and currency instability during peacetime are not conducive to FDI. Furthermore, high parallel market premia, which a proxy for distortions, inconsistent policies, and corruption, affect investment adversely. Table 9 presents a family of simple pairwise correlations to summarize these points, while Tables 10 and 11 present a synopsis of the literature on the empirical determinants of FDI. At first glance, our findings seem to depart strikingly from those of Gastanaga et. al (1998) , who find no evidence that the parallel market premia influences FDI.
Of course, one interpretation of our contrasting results that merits further scrutiny is that they have a separate variable controlling for corruption. As shown in Table 9 , the premia is correlated with this type of index, suggesting that the results are not necessarily inconsistent--all the more so if, as we contend, lack of transparency breeds corruption. Schneider and Frey (1985) 54 developing countries for 3 different years (1976, 1979 and 1980 Mainly two exercise. The first tests the effect of corruption on FDI and the second tests the effect of corruption on the composition of capital flows. Fixed-effects and random-effects specifications were used. In case of the first exercise, the majority of variables were and with the expected signs. Corruption has a very significant negative effect on FDI. Second exercise reveals that the higher is the corruption, the more is the composition of capital flows tilts toward more bank loans and portfolio flows and less of FDI. Results were found robust to the change in the sample period to 1997-98.
Source: Excerpts from Kamaly (2001). Panel analysis was used (fixed effects and common intercept). Generally movements in flows are influenced more by fundamentals than GF. EU dummy was found significant in driving total flows and FDI. The interest rate variable was not significant in any of the 7 definitions of flows. Reforms appear to be the most important force in driving flows. Source: Excerpts from Kamaly (2001) .
Our emphasis, thus far, has been on the different ways monetary policy contributes to spur or deter investment. We have discussed one of the causes of inflation in Africa-namely wars and civil conflict-but there are other causes for high and chronic inflation in the region that merit discussion. The next section focuses on the issue of fiscal dominance, which seems to be a promising explanation of why inflation has been difficult to tame in may of the countries in the region.
V. Fiscal Dominance and Inflation
In most of the world, and throughout most of history, episodes of very high inflation have almost invariably arisen out of situations of broader macroeconomic and political instability.
Governments desperate to finance large fiscal deficits will turn to the printing presses to finance expenditures. Large and uncontrolled fiscal deficits occur for many reasons but political instability of some form is surely the leading cause. Inflation taxation is nothing new; even in Roman times, it was a standard technique to shave precious metal coins and recycle them in smaller form. Governments would also debase the currency by diluting the precious metal content of coins and by changing their metal content altogether. The advent of the modern printing press, for better or for worse, only served to vastly improve the technology for generating inflation.
When the government is starved for resources and lacks sufficient taxation alternatives, it is obvious that the need to finance fiscal deficits leads to monetary expansio n and inflation. An absolutely critical question, however, in assessing a monetary regime is to ask under what conditions monetary expansion and inflation policy can be separated from fiscal policy. Again, it is useful to frame the debate in the context of modern monetary policy among industrialized countries. In academic circles, there is currently a significant debate over whether "fiscal dominance" may be the rule, rather than the exception, even in low inflation industrialized countries. The subtle difference from the canonical case of a poor high inflation country, however, is that inflation is leveraged on a much higher base of nominal debt, including not only currency but nominal government debt. Sargent and Wallace (1981) , in their classic article "Unpleasant monetarist arithmetic" first stressed how, even in countries with apparently strong monetary institutions, rising and uncontrolled government budget deficits can arguably feed back quickly into inflation if agents expect that someday monetary ind ependence will snap under the burden of rising government debt. In theory, expectations of future money growth can be so large as to lead to high inflation immediately, overwhelming the efforts of the central bank to attain monetary tightness.
Recently, the Sargent-Wallace argument has been sharpened into "The fiscal theory of the price level," (Leeper, 1991; Sims; and Woodford, 1994 .) The basic argument is that one can always write the government's intertemporal budget constraint as
EQUATION 1: (Nominal government debt)/ price level = The present value of real government expenditures minus the present value of real government taxes (including the inflation tax)
Equation (1) simply states that the present value of the government's future surpluses, including the inflation tax, must equal the real value of its debt (nominal debt over the price level.) For simplicity, we have simplified by looking at a certainty equivalent formulation. In reality, of course, the right hand side of equation (1) would actually correspond to a function of the expected value of future government surpluses, which are uncertain. Equation (1) has to hold if the government is solvent; if the real value of expected future surpluses were less than the real value of the debt, the market value of the debt would have to drop immediately, which could be effected by an increase in the price level. (Things are a bit trickier in a sticky-price world where bonds would temporarily sell at discount, but in the long run prices would adjust and the story is the same.) If people expected that the government would never run surpluses, they would never voluntarily hold government debt except for money needed to finance transactions. Of course, in many developing countries, domestic banks are sometimes forced to hold government debt, but in terms of equation (1), forced holding of government debt should be thought of as a way of expanding the taxes that enter on the left hand side.
Equation (1), of course, is nothing new--it is simply a budget constraint that has long been well understood. However, in the traditional literature on industrialized countries, it was typically assumed that the path of the price level could be determined by monetary policy, via a traditional relationship where
EQUATION 2: Supply of real balances = Nominal money/ price level = The demand for real money balances
Given the price level and the future path of monetary policy (implied by the monetary authorities prospective as well as current policies), the price level in equation (1) is given. Because today's value of nominal government debt is given by history, the implication is that in order to ensure that equation (1) holds, fiscal policy must adjust, if not today, then in the future. Thus, the implicit assumption is that the monetary authorities never have to capitulate to the fiscal authorities, so that monetary policy is "dominant" in the determination of the price level.
-25 -The fiscal theory of the price level challenges this assumption that monetary policy is dominant. Instead, advocates of the fiscal theory of the price level argue that, even in industrialized countries, fiscal policy is dominant and it is monetary policy that must adjust.
More precisely, monetary policy can adopt an interest rate policy, and the path of prices will adjust. In a flexible price world, the initial price level must therefore adjust to assure that intertemporal budget balance is attained in a manner consistent with the path of primary surpluses (which is exogenous) and the path of interest rates (which is exogenous).
There is considerable debate in the academic literature over whether the fiscal theory of the price level really applies, or whether the traditional view that monetary policy is dominant in setting the price level is the correct one. Very recent work has started to focus on whether there is some threshold level debt and fiscal position that will tilt the balance from monetary to fiscal dominance. For the low inflation industrialized countries, the evidence appears to suggest tha t the traditional monetary dominance paradigm is still the correct one. Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001) , for example, show empirically that a rise in (an innovation in) the government surplus typically causes a rise in future surpluses and a fall in future government liabilities. The traditional monetary dominant regime offers a simple explanation, namely that shocks that lead to surpluses tend to be positively correlated over time. Thus, a rise in the path of surpluses allows the government to pay down part of the government debt leading to a fall in future liabilities. The fiscal theory of the price level can explain these results also, but the explanation is rather contorted. The rise in surplus today must eventually become negatively correlated with future surpluses, and this negative correlation must be great enough to make the present value of the future surpluses fall (rather than rise), thus leading to a fall in the value of liabilities. (Part of what makes the fiscal theory of the price level so popular among young researchers is precisely the fact that it gives such counterintuitive results.) For industrialized countries, there are also other reasons to be skeptical about the fiscal theory of the price level. For example, it can be shown that as long as the path of government real deficits has some self-correcting mechanism, so that deficits decline as debt grows, monetary policy dominance must prevail. For example, the budget and deficit conditions of the Maastricht treaty turn out to be sufficient to ensure monetary dominance, indeed they are much stronger than is necessary. Also, it turns out that in, say, a two country world, it is not logically possible to have the fiscal theory of the price level hold in both countries, provided they have open trade and capital markets (Loyo, 1996) .
Although the fiscal theory of the price level may not be empirically relevant for industrialized countries outside extreme circumstances, it may be more relevant for emergingmarket and developing countries. In particular, the conditions on self-correcting budget deficits needed to ensure monetary dominance may not always hold, so that the fiscal theory of the price level becomes potentially relevant. This is almost certainly the case in high inflation countries where monetary institutions have little meaningful independence from the central government.
Unfortunately, we do not have firm evidence yet on the factors which determine when fiscal dominance occurs, although the factors almost surely include high debt levels. For example, government debt/GDP levels above 200 percent are almost never observed (except in cases of concessional lending), presumably because fiscal dominance comes into play and the real debt level is restrained by inflation and by inflation expectations. Debt levels below 50 percent of GDP, however, may still be a problem in countries that have very weak tax systems. In Table 12 , below, we present some suggestive evidence on the possible link between debt levels and inflation for African countries for various periods. The simple correlations between overall government debt-to-GDP or debt-to-exports mostly go in the right direction. For the CFA franc zone group, these are strikingly high and always statistically significant, irrespective of what samp le period or what measure of indebtedness is used. For the non-CFA franc African countries, the results are somewhat more sensitive to the sample and debt measure that is used.
There is a strongly significant correlation between debt-to-exports and inflation in the earlier part of the sample which breaks down in the 1990s-at the same time that the correlation between debt-to-GDP and inflation is increasing and becoming significant in the more recent period.
Figures 8 and 9 show the scatter plots of the underlying data for CFA and non CFA countries respectively. 1970-1979,1980-1989, 1990-2001 0.182* 0.669* 0.202* 1980-1989, 1990-2001 0.192 1970-1979,1980-1989, 1990-2001 averages 0.115 0.860* 0.137 1980-1989, 1990-2001 
VI. Concluding Remarks
We have presented evidence that major events, such as wars and civil unrest occur more frequently in Africa than in other regions. We think that the probability of such adverse outcomes has a critical influence on the investment climate. Such disastrous events often bring other evils with them, including high inflation, a higher level of other distortions such as capital controls that help parallel and illegal currency markets thrive. While bouts of high inflation and all-too-frequent currency crashes are not unique to Africa (witness Western Hemisphere's track record in this regard), the level of opaqueness and distortions, as revealed by the persistent prevalence of extremely high parallel market premia, is a more unique (non CFA) African phenomenon. In this regard, we believe there are tremendous benefits to be reaped by adopting unified exchange rate regimes broadly throughout the region.
These challenges are, indeed, difficult to overcome, but not insurmountable. Not many years ago, Uganda suffered from all the ills discussed in this paper: war, high inflation, frequent collapses in its currency, and dual markets with a parallel market premia that hit 567 percent in 1988. The end of the war was, of course, the most critical change. But macroeconomic stabilization, has brought inflation down to below 5 percent, growth has sharply rebounded, and and consistency it takes to build an attractive investment climate. Nevertheless, a unified exchange rate regime (or at least very low parallel premia) is a key element in a transparent macroeconomic framework, and would help produce many beneficial side effects in terms of improving governance and reducing corruption.
The costs of inflation
Is inflation by itself such a problem? The answer is almost surely yes, but economists' theoretical and empirical evidence on the question is remarkably thin. Because high inflation so seldom occurs in isolation from other macroeconomic problems, time series or cross-country regressions that show a cost of inflation on growth or output are not always convincing, since it is difficult to hold everything else constant. For inflation rates over forty percent per annum, there does seem to be evidence that growth is retarded (see Easterly, 2001 and Rogoff, 2002) . For lower inflation rates, below forty percent, the evidence is more limited. This is not to say that a country that has an inflation rate of ten percent is not clearly better off than a country with an inflation rate of twenty percent, and that a country with an inflation rate of two percent is not better off than one with ten percent. The general reduction in inflation rates that has taken place across much of the world over the past ten to twenty years has almost surely been a factor in raising global growth and increasing macroeconomic stability. Recall again Figure 2 of the text, which gives annual growth rates both for the world (using PPP weights) and for the G7 group of countries. Visually, the decease in volatility of output growth since the mid-1980s, is striking. Not all countries have enjoyed the same improvement in macroeconomic stability over this period. The United States has enjoyed a particularly large drop in output volatility since the mid-1980s (see Stock and Watson, 2002) , whereas output volatility for Germany appears to have remained roughly constant (reflecting no doubt German unification in 1991) and for Japan, it has actually increased (an outgrowth of the bursting of the asset price bubble in the early 1990s, and a reduction in trend productivity growth.) But for most countries, increasing monetary stability has been accompanied by increased output stability. The casual evidence presented in chart I may or may not stand up to careful statistical testing; that is not our purpose here. But it is evidence of a broad trend that has helped persuade many that increasing monetary stability does pay off, even at lower levels of inflation.
At a theoretical level, it has taken even longer to assess why inflation matters, especially if it is stable and anticipated. Fischer and Modigliani (1977) is an early attempt to try to catalogue all the various and sundry theoretical costs of inflation. Their basic conclusion is that the main costs of stable and perfectly anticipated inflation are the "shoe-leather costs," that is, the costs to people of having to economize on their holdings of (real) currency balances in order to minimize their share of the inflation tax. The costs of unanticipated inflation are much greater, particularly in a world of imperfect information and imperfect indexing. Keynes (1936) , of course, argued that in the real world, indexing of wages and prices to inflation is very limited (at low to moderate levels of inflation), so that monetary volatility translates directly into variability in output and employment. Though economists have made little progress in understanding exactly why nominal rigidities are so important, Keynes' basic insight is very much alive today.
There is a broader question of why, even in today's hyper-sophisticated (indeed hyperactive) financial markets, there is not greater capacity to index to inflation. Absent such indexation, and given long-term nominal contracts, then uncertain inflation is quite harmful to economic activity, making investment planning difficulty, and making it difficult to continuously maintain full employment (or whatever the modern search-theory equivalent of full employment is). The government is possibly the greatest source of nominal rigidities in the economy. Tax systems, especially, have important non-neutralities. Some are well known, e.g., if tax rates are increasing in income, then inflation will raise average tax levels. If taxes take significant amounts of time to collect, then rises in the rate of inflation can lower effective real tax rates, if agents are able to pay the government with a lag in depreciated currency. Many governments tax nominal rather than real interest receipts.
All of these are fairly primitive failures of indexation. Feldstein (1998) has emphasized that the effective rate of capital taxation -which is enormously complicated to calculate in practice -can be very sensitive to inflation rates even at low levels. For example, even starting from an inflation rate as low as two percent, a one percent reduction in inflation might raise the capital stock as much as 3 percent, according to Feldstein's calculations. In principle, this problem could be solved via adequate indexation of the corporate income tax. In practice, the accounting issues are so complicated that it is much easier to deal with the problem by simply having a lower rate of inflation. This last example is particularly interesting because it highlights how, in the complex modern world, the distinction between high inflation and variable inflation is not as sharp as one might think. When one looks at corporate accounting and taxation, inflation can lead to problems even if when it changes only very slowly, since it is so costly land difficult to adapt capital taxation and depreciation rules adequately to compensate.
The more important distinction, for our purposes here, is to distinguish between the effects of inflation in isolation from other forms of macroeconomic instability (e.g, if a modern industrialized-country central bank mistakenly, and temporarily, adapts an inefficient control technique), from the costs of inflation instability in a country where the government has a shorttime horizon and where inflation is accompanied by numerous other macroeconomic problems.
The latter is almost surely the typical case in most countries where inflation is over 40 percent.
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